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TOWARD A WORLD ORDER RESPECTFUL 
OF THE GLOBAL ECOSYSTEM 
By Richard A. Falk·~ 
THE NEED FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER 
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 brought an end to the Thirty 
Years' War and marked the beginning of the modern system of 
world order which accepts, as its basis, the autonomy of sovereign 
states. To this day, the quality of world order reflects the inter-
actions between national governments. Threats and warfare have 
been the most salient of these interactions, constituting both the 
principal energy of change and the main instrument of order in 
world affairs. 
World Wars I and II brought about a determined effort to 
mitigate the effects of global politics based on war by building up 
central international institutions of peace and security. The 
League of Nations and the United Nations were the main prod-
ucts of these efforts, but these organizations have acted pri-
marily as instruments of sovereign cooperation rather than as 
substitutes for the dominance of sovereign states. The military 
power of states continues to reside at national levels, and the 
driving forces in world affairs continue to be associated with in-
tense competition for disputed territory, economic control and 
political influence. From 1914 to 1970 is not a long period of time 
in which to transform governing structures, public attitudes, and 
the political consciousness of elite groups. The great historical 
question, accentuated by the persisting danger oflarge-scale nu-
clear war, is whether the political life of mankind can be reorgan-
ized before rather than after some kind of catastrophic break-
down. 
National governments are no longer able to solve the most se-
rious problems facing the welfare and security of their own popu-
lations. We have grown accustomed to this basic reality in rela-
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tion to nuclear weaponry. We now know that immense budgetary 
expenditures on military hardware by the United States have led, 
not to greater security, but to offsetting measures by principal 
adversary governments, and that the two strongest states in the 
world would be likely to lose at least 100 million people as well as 
their major cities in the first 24 hours of an all-out attack by 
either side. There is no defense system that either of these states 
can now construct that is likely to work if the other state makes 
an all-out effort to penetrate it. Therefore, peace and security de-
pend on the will and wisdom of the eli te of a foreign governmen t, 
and not upon the military prowess and preparedness of a de-
fensive state. Such a reality makes us aware of the thin line, 
precariously maintained by fallible human beings and complex 
electronic equipment, which separates security from catastrophe 
in our world. 
In the last few years this fundamental international condition 
has been further complicated by a new set of dangers associated 
with mounting pressures on the global environment. These pres-
sures stem from the cumulative interplay of population growth 
and technological development. At this stage we do not yet have 
the facts and figures to enable a full appreciation of the scale of 
danger, nor do we know enough about the tolerance limits of 
oceans, river systems, and the atmosphere to identify with any 
precision the danger points and, especially, to specify thresholds 
of irreversibility. As ecologists have started to warn us, many en-
vironmental systems do not deteriorate gradually but, rather, 
are able to main tain the basic in tegri ty of their character virtuall y 
until the point of collapse. It is this deception of man by nature 
that has contributed, for instance, to the ecological collapse of 
large inland water systems such as Lake Erie; warnings about 
deterioration were discounted for years because of fairly favor-
able quality reports until the time of abrupt collapse, at which 
point the processes of decay could no longer be feasibly arrested. 
The point is that we do not know the extent to which the in-
creased pollution of the oceans and atmosphere is generating a 
process of decay that will soon cross thresholds of irreversibility, 
nor do we even have effective means at present to collect such in-
formation. We do know that there has been an immense buildup 
of harmful pollutants in the oceans, most especially of oil, lead, 
mercury, and DDT, and that major disruptive impacts on marine 
ecosystems are likely to occur at some point in the future. Sim-
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ilarly, we know that these pressures are likely to continue and to 
grow worse as more and more people organize to live at higher 
standards of living, and as industrial societies develop more and 
more sophisticated technologies to facilitate their further mastery 
over nature. 
The frequency and the severity of environmental crises having 
international implications is clearly increasing. The Torrey Can-
yon breakup is an example of the inevitable outcome of a rapidly 
expanding volume of oceanic transport of oil by tankers. The 
record shows that the increasing number of tanker accidents each 
year corresponds roughly to the increasing volume of activity. 
The increasing rate at which man exploits the planet is leading to 
other problems and challenges which may be less specific but are 
potentially even more disastrous. The possibility that radioactive 
and other highly toxic wastes may have serious impact on life in 
the oceans, the fear of global weather modification arising inad-
vertently from the buildup of CO2 and particulate matter in the 
atmosphere, and the chances of earthquakes resulting from under-
ground nuclear explosions are but a few examples. At this stage 
we have not yet even drawn up a complete or accurate agenda of 
issues, but it is evident that the political fragmentation of man-
kind into separately administered states handicaps the efforts to 
solve any of them. The basic ecological premise posits the whole-
ness and interconnectedness of things. 1 It already seems clear 
that the basis of life on earth is imperiled by the absence of any 
central mechanisms of effective guidance and control on an inter-
national level. 
THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF SOVEREIGN STATES: 
PERMISSIVE EXPLOITATION 
Unlike domestic society, the activities of men and nations in 
the international realm are virtually free from consistent patterns 
of regulation. In the present system, land on the continents and 
the airspace above it are viewed as the private property of indi-
viduals or nations, while the oceans and the airspace over oceans 
are viewed as belonging to everyone, to be shared and used for 
mutual benefit. People are not revising their attitudes toward 
property, in spite of developments in modern technology which 
render obsolete the premises underlying the present system. It is 
helpful to isolate three basic premises to which these remarks 
apply. 
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1. The Premise of Excess Capacity. In earlier decades, the vol-
ume of human demands being made on the environment was 
small in relation to the capacity of the environment to sustain 
life. Although local shortages of food, water, and land have long 
existed, and rivalries among social groups have generated wars, 
the dynamics of conflict have seemed to be fully consistent with 
the indefinite continuation of life on earth. Even the forecasts 
about the end of the world which are found in several major re-
ligious traditions do not reveal any awareness of the finiteness of 
the earth as an island in space sustaining a limited quantity oflife 
and vulnerable to ecological disaster. 
The situation today has been greatly moderated by the devel-
opment of modern public health and by dramatic advances in 
agriculture. As a result, the world can accommodate a far larger 
number of people in the sense of keeping them alive, but in the 
course of so doing, especially in industrialized societies, great 
pressures on the environment have built up. The limited capacity 
of our air and water to disperse our wastes, the limited yields of 
minerals which can be extracted from rocks close to the surface 
of the earth, and the vanishing of species are among the factors 
which have recently made us aware of global scarcity and have 
undermined our earlier confidence in global abundance. Interna-
tional society, however, continues to be almost completely un-
regulated, in spite of the fact that a laissez-faire system of organ-
ization is only effective in the absence of scarcity. 
Regulation is currently limited to special situations where over-
use creates "conservation" issues, as with whale hunting. The ex-
perience with whale hunting is a dismal one, but is worth recount-
ing because it illustrates the limited prospects for effective en-
forcement when sovereign states are not held accountable for fail-
ure to comply. 
In 1946 those nations involved in whaling negotiated and 
signed a convention which established the principle of quotas for 
annual whale catches. Whale catches were to be limited in such a 
way that whaling interests could sustain profitable yields over 
long periods of time, a typical management goal whenever a re-
newable resource (timber is another example) is involved. How-
ever, the International Whaling Commission, which was to ad-
minister the convention, possessed neither the power nor the in-
dependence from the national whaling industries that was neces-
sary to carry out the conservation program. At first, the quotas 
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were set at levels beyond what could be caught, and hence were 
meaningless. Then, when in spite of reduced catches whaling 
companies still said that there was no scientific evidence that 
whales were endangered, the International Whaling Commission 
asked authorities in population dynamics to study the problem in 
detail. In 1963 they filed a report to the International Whaling 
Commission substantiating the dangers, but the Commission re-
fused to act on it. A report filed in 1964 with additional informa-
tion met a similar fate. At this point the International Whaling 
Commission almost broke up, since by the convention it was 
obliged to act in accordance with any scientific evidence pre-
sented to it. Finally, in 1965 a special meeting was called, and 
quotas which began to take account of the scientific recommen-
dations were agreed upon. Since then, the quotas have slowly 
come more into line with the recommendations, although with no 
enforcement machinery and no international observers it is diffi-
cult to judge to what extent even these limits have been heeded. 
Meanwhile, the blue whale, the largest animal that has ever lived 
on earth, is headed for extinction. Probably fewer than 300 blue 
whales remain at this time. 
At present Russia and Japan, the only major whaling nations, 
are responsible for about 85 percent of the activity. The United 
States annually has bought about 20 percent of all whale prod-
ucts, mostly from Japan. Recently the United States decided to 
act unilaterally. On December 5, 1969, President Nixon signed 
into law the Endangered Species Act; on June 2, 1970, the De-
partment of the Interior published a list of the species which were 
to be protected; all species of giant whales were included. Because 
of this new law, no whale or whale products in any form can be 
brought into the United States. But enlightened though belated 
actions by single governments cannot disguise the fact that this 
experiment in international cooperation has so far been a failure. 
2. The Premise of Local Impact. A system of sovereign and in-
dependent states is appropriate only for an era when the conse-
quences of a nation's actions are confined within its own terri-
tories. Even today most events continue to be oflocal significance 
in this sense, and can be regulated by local governing bodies. 
Special situations sometimes arise, as when state A allows its in-
dustrial corporations to dispose of raw wastes upstream and the 
downstream users in state B become victims of pollution; if 
causation is clear, the states generally deal with one another di-
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recdy. Measures to curb water pollution and to provide for 
navigation on the Danube and Rhine rivers illustrate the ca-
pacity of the present system to evolve generally satisfactory co-
operative procedures. The treaty method has acted as a flexible 
instrument of adjustment where the actions in one state have 
been causing damage to another. 
But when the effects are more diffuse and represent the cumu-
lative outcome of numerous, separate, small instances, each of 
which may seem trivial, even benign, as with industrial processes 
underlying ocean and air pollution, then the present system 
shows almost no capacity for successful response. Nuclear testing 
in the atmosphere is a spectacular example of the widening scope 
and lengthening duration of events located specifically in space 
and time (that is, at the test site at the time of the test). Simi-
larly, the balance of gases in the global atmosphere can be al-
tered, with implications for the global climate, by the combustion 
of fossil fuels in a single country, or even, perhaps, by the opera-
tion of a single nation's fleet of supersonic aircraft. 
3. The Premise oj Compatible Use. In the past, when resources 
were plentiful and actions were localized, the use of one geo-
graphical arena rarely restricted the use of any other, nor did dif-
ferent uses of the same arena often overlap in dangerous ways. 
Exploitation of the land and the rivers did not have serious re-
percussions upon the use of the oceans, and vice versa. In addi-
tion, the principal uses of the oceans for navigation, fishing, and 
naval operations were generally mutually compatible. Certain 
specific conflicts might occur-for instance, by overfishing in a 
particular area-but these could usually be either resolved by 
specific agreement or allowed to result in the temporarl deteriora-
tion of a particular resource. The international law 0 the oceans 
accommodated basic needs by finding compromises between na-
tional sovereignty and community control. Coastal nations, for 
example, were granted a belt of special authority over offshore 
waters in recognition of special security, economic, and health 
interests-a procedure that worked well so long as the territorial 
needs of these nations were limited to within a few miles of the 
shore. On the "high seas" nations have agreed not to interfere 
with each other's activities, and these agreements have worked 
largely because the separate activities were mutually compatible. 
In recent years, however, these arrangements have come under 
increasing pressure, and terri torial sovereign ty has been expanded 
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at the expense of the areas to which a community concept once 
applied. This has happened for several reasons. First, the tech-
nology of war has increased the distance from the shore at which a 
country can be threatened militarily. Second, the technology of 
fishing and mining has made it possible for the most advanced 
countries to operate at great distances from their homeland and 
more successfully than coastal states relying on more primitive 
techniques. As a result poorer states have claimed protective 
custody over vast stretches of ocean water; Chile, Ecuador and 
Peru, for instance, have claimed exclusive sovereign control over 
waters 200 miles from their shores. Third, the value of mineral 
resources on the continental shelf has led states to claim this 
wealth for their own nationals. 
Beyond this, evidence is emerging that there are incompatibil-
ities of use even in the areas of the ocean not claimed by any 
state. Reliance on persistent pesticides for agricultural develop-
ment on land causes damage to marine ecology in the middle of 
the ocean in a variety of ways, still not fully understood. Simi-
larly, attempts to mine the oceans' mineral resources may en-
danger fishing industries. And finally the use of the ocean for the 
disposal of lethal nerve gas may cause harm to the en tire com-
munity of ocean users and to the ocean itself. 
In summary, current methods of regulating activity on land 
and in the oceans are geared to lower levels of demand for goods 
and to less sophisticated technologies of exploitation than now 
exist. The existing system of competition among sovereign states 
is not only obsolete, however; it is also counterproductive. 
The logic of competition induces maximum self-assertion, con-
trary to the collective good.2 Countries agree to cooperate today 
only when the issue is trivial or merely facilitative (for example, 
fixing the conditions of international postal service or governing 
the exchange of diplomats). But countries cannot be compelled to 
cooperate, and the objective of a majority of the nations of the 
world is often thwarted when cooperation is not universal. Thus 
China and France can continue to contaminate the globe with 
radioactive fallout, in disregard of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
and Japanese whalers can ignore the international regime set up 
to assure whale conservation. South Africa can continue with 
racial oppression, Brazil can encourage population growth, and 
the United States can dump as much nerve gas into the oceans as 
it wishes. 
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The sale of arms provides a good example of how competition 
between nations impedes the development of international con-
trols. Most national governments are eager to build up a favor-
able balance of trade and regard it as highly desirable to earn large 
quan ti ties of foreign exchange. Arms sales to foreign coun tries are 
very tempting, especially when the decision to forego the sale is 
likely merely to shift the transaction to another less scrupulous 
country, with the result that the earnings and, quite possibly, 
political leverage are lost. Sales can be restricted only if all prin-
cipal suppliers curb their activities effectively and simultaneously. 
Given the degree of divisiveness in international society, it should 
not be surprising that it is difficult to make such a cooperative 
system work reliably. In fact, the realization of difficulty induces 
a sense of futility. Why try if trying is likely to penalize the more 
civic-minded national governments? The experience with inter-
national sanctions also illustrates the limits of cooperation in 
much the same way. The high degree of verbal consensus in sup-
port of economic sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia 
has not achieved its goals, principally because South Africa and 
a few other countries do not want these sanctions to work. 
The competition between nations which is partially responsible 
for the environmental crisis is also responsible for distracting at-
tention from it. Can one imagine a discussion of environmental 
quality between an Arab and an Israeli leader? These and other 
nations are preoccupied by international rivalries, and devote 
their resources and energies mainly to promoting national se-
curity. 
Habits of competition also impel the poor nations to pursue 
what the rich nations possess. Rich and poor alike specify self-
interest in terms of more wealth, more power, more growth, and 
sometimes even more people. The possibility of a global environ-
mental crisis is on the verge of providing the rich nations with new 
excuses to neglect the demands of the poor nations, however. 
There is serious reason to question whether the globe could 
remain habitable if the entire world population were to live 
the way Americans live at the present time, with all the in-
efficiency and waste now present in American society. The rich 
nations may perceive this as a valid reason for trying to persuade 
the poor nations to modify their plans for industrialization. But 
the poor nations are likely to repudiate this advice and urge the 
rich nations to control their consumption. Moreover, the poor 
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countries are sure to point out that the gap between standards of 
living in the rich and poor countries is still widening. 
The present inequalities and rivalries among nations thus 
complicate any attempt to replace competitive patterns of be-
havior by cooperative ones. The current negotiations over the 
terms of the international inspection of nuclear power installa-
tions in countries not possessing nuclear weapons is a case in 
point. In accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
national nuclear programs are to be inspected by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), after a state voluntarily 
offers to have its program subject to external control. When 
IAEA inspection finally begins in 1972, inspectors are likely to 
find their role limited to that of auditors. Italy, Japan, and West 
Germany want inspection confined to the input and output of the 
nuclear plants, for fear that inspectors who obtained knowledge 
of techniques used inside the plants might give useful information 
to competitors.3 
About the only way in which present inequalities could have 
beneficial implications for the global environment is by opening 
up opportunities for ecological trade-offs. For example, indus-
trial countries might establish preferential trade relations with 
those poorer countries that agree to use safe substitutes for DDT. 
In the great majority of instances, however, the habits of competi-
tion among nations will retard the search for methods of global 
environmental control. 
There are some significant exceptions to this bleak picture that 
illustrate the potentiality for international cooperation within the 
present system of sovereign states. A treaty signed on December 
1,1959, has so far effectively ruled out a competitive struggle for 
sovereign control over the Antarctic and has allowed the 12 in-
terested nations to pursue their separate courses of scientific in-
vestigation and discovery in a spirit of harmony and cooperation. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) works on problems 
common to all countries, including control and eradication of dis-
eases, and the protection of health through public health ser-
vices. Its concern with environmental health problems, research, 
and education is the concern of countries, and thus WHO can 
work harmoniously, effectively, and without fanfare. On a bi-
national level, joint commissions that have been in existence for a 
long time are suddenly being reinvigorated in response to the 
recent upsurge of interest in environmental regulation. For in-
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stance, representatives of the governments of the United States 
and Canada held a meeting in June 1970 to discuss common 
problems of pollution and eutrophication in the Great Lakes. 
They agreed to adopt and enforce certain common measures, in-
cluding regulations requiring removal of at least 80 percent, of 
phosphates from sewage and industrial waste disposal. Also, the 
Soviet Union and the United States have had some success in 
reaching agreements that prevent the arms race from being fully 
carried over to outer space or the ocean floor and have stimulated 
wider agreements to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons, 
such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. The current proposals before the United Nations which 
would prohibit weapons from being stationed on the ocean floor 
are further encouraging signs. 
PROSPECTS FOR AN ADEQUATE WORLD ORDER SYSTEM 
At the present stage of international development, there is no 
general or common appreciation of the threats of the environ-
ment orwhat to do about them. The United Nations is scheduling 
an initial world conference in 1972, but it is unlikely to provide 
more than an exchange of views and suspicions, and possibly 
the formulation of highly abstract declaratory standards. There is 
not as yet any appropriate sense of the magnitude of the task and 
of its urgency, and there is no understanding of the extent to 
which the protection of the environment will require an organiza-
tional and attitudinal revolution on a global level. Such a lack of 
awareness persists in government circles, even in a country such 
as the United States which has grown alarmed about environ-
mental issues in recent years. 
Yet, eventually, change must come. Separate, unequal, com-
peting sovereign states will have to be replaced as prime cen-
ters of international decision making in the environmental field, 
and world political institutions to which responsibility will pass 
must be given the authority to monitor the environmental condi-
tion of the planet, to react quickly to disasters, to ration scarce 
resources, to zone international waters according to permissible 
uses, to set pollution standards, and to enforce its rules and regu-
lations. It is likely that global institutions will be expected to 
resolve conflicts, apportion resources, and secure human justice 
in a wider range of situations than would be suggested by a nar-
row interpretation of conservation and environmental manage-
ment. 
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Suppose a limited form of world government were to come into 
existence, with power to regulate all uses of the ocean. How should 
it use this power? It certainly would change the present system of 
registering ships, whereby a small country like Liberia can es-
tablish exceptionally permissive licensing procedures because 
it is more concerned with revenues from tanker registries than 
with the protection of the oceans against unseaworthy vessels. 
The Torrey Canyon, a substandard oil tanker registered in 
Liberia, might not have been permitted to operate in a more 
ecologically conscious world. But what about the extraction of 
natural resources from the ocean? Should our hypothetical world 
organization forbid all mining by the enterprises of individual na-
tions and do the mining itself? Should it instead issue licenses? 
Should it collect royalties or taxes, and if so, how should the 
revenues be used? Most important, should it regulate the dis-
tribution of the minerals extracted from the oceans, and if so, 
according to what principle? There are a host of alternative eco-
nomic and political models of operation that could be incorpo-
rated into such a world organization. 
The distinct ecological consequences of various modes of op-
eration may be difficult to discern. For example, an ocean resource 
policy that puts a heavy penalty on ocean extraction may drive 
individual nations to exploit their domestic reserves beyond wise 
limits. A country might decide not to extract oil from shale by 
underground nuclear explosions if deep ocean oil were readily 
available. It might decide to station fewer power plants on its 
rivers and lakes if deep ocean sites were permitted. Should a 
world organization encourage or discourage exploitation of the 
ocean resources? If it discourages their exploitation, is there any 
way in which it can simultaneously affect resource use within the 
territorial limits of the sovereign states? 
The last question suggests that we reexamine our hypotheti-
cal world organization. Does it make sense to separate the prob-
lem of ocean management from land management? Politically, 
this separation could be a practical way to gain experience with 
the kinds of jurisdictional problems that arise from the interplay 
of modern technology and ecology. A more extensive form of 
world order could emerge from success in undertaking such a 
modest first step. Ecological realities, however, could make such 
a scheme unworkable. Improper land use practices can lead to 
the deterioration of coastal estuaries, which in turn can disrupt 
the life cycles of much of ocean life. Thus it may make better 
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ecological sense for a world organization to acquire authority over 
land use and ocean use in a coordinated fashion. To maintain 
political equilibrium during the coming period of transition will 
tax the skills of the world's diplomats and international lawyers 
to an unprecedented degree. 
It is clear that the establishment of a world government in and 
of itself does not guarantee a saner approach to the environment 
than what we now have. Indeed, we can speculate that if we had 
had an obtuse world government for the last few decades, things 
could be a lot worse. Suppose that twenty years ago, before the 
environmental crisis was widely recognized, world-wide pressures 
to remove the threat of nuclear war had brought about the re-
placemen t of the present political system with a world govern-
ment. That government would probably have sought to over-
come some of the inequalities among nations by stimulating 
capital transfers and by building huge power and agroindustrial 
projects to take advantage of the aggregate capacities of river 
basin systems and other large natural networks. Several projects 
of this kind have been retarded, thus far, by national boundaries 
and sovereign competition (even among friendly neighbors such 
as the United States and Canada or Mexico). Such political ob-
stacles to man's intrusion upon nature would almost certainly 
have been cast aside, if world government had been instituted in a 
period prior to the emergence of some sensitivity about environ-
mental quality. 
Even the present period may be too soon from this point of 
view, for every potent world ideology today continues to maintain 
a strong commitment to achieving a maximum economic growth 
through the rapid expansion of the industrial sector and this 
commitment accelerates environmental decay. However the de-
cay, in turn, is producing a shock of recognition in the richest and 
most industrialized countries; a greater awareness of the toler-
ances of the planet is beginning to emerge. Therefore it is fortui-
tous that environmental awareness, which strengthens the anti-
war pressures for a more cooperatively conceived organization of 
life on earth, may at the same time reduce some of the hazards of 
concentration of authority. The sequence of pressures may lead to 
a more rational eventual solution. Yet it remains questionable 
whether there is enough time available to make adjustments in 
the world-order system. These adjustments can not take place 
until after significant movements for world-order reform emerge 
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in the main cultural, ethnic, political, and economic centers of 
world activity. 
The future of human society depends on making the case per-
suasive that the present pattern of relations governing man-in-
society and man in nature endangers the whole species and the 
entire planet, and that positive alternatives exist and can be 
brought into being. The mere depiction of disaster is likely to 
discourage action unless it is coupled with a program for positive 
action. Fear in isolation induces immobility, not conversion and 
passionate action. We need to develop plausible alternatives to 
global disaster, and to establish a humane set of substitutes for 
the automatic checks of war, disease and famine-which never 
were compatible with the dignity of man and society. The need 
is for new visions of world order based on the conditions of dy-
namic equilibrium between man and nature. 
In the meantime stopgap measures and educational activities 
are useful kinds of initiatives. It will be desirable to take action to 
avoid specific disasters, for instance, radioactive leakage from nu-
clear power plants or the further pollution of international rivers 
and lakes. It may also be possible to engage in joint ventures to 
ensure that only beneficial appropriation of minerals from the 
oceans takes place. Institutions through which nations cooperate 
are rapidly expanding in number, variety, and role to meet the 
needs of an increasingly interdependent world, and they should 
provide considerable experience and a cadre of experts with ca-
reers and values built around a more cooperative approach to 
international relations. Only a shared sense of the problems 
facing mankind will make it possible to work toward a shared 
solution. We possess the technology of communication, informa-
tion-dispersal, and transportation that will facilitate centralized 
management. Indeed the efficiency of these new technologies 
poses a new set of threats to human welfare that will need to be 
taken in to account. 
Minor adjustments within the existing international order can 
do no more than gain time for the initiation of drastic changes in 
the world-order system. The need for drastic change suggests the 
likelihood of struggle between those who operate and benefit from 
the present political system and those who support the creation of 
~ an increasingly powerful world government. Good education, as 
always, should pursue a strategy of subversion, weakening confi-
dence in existing arrangements, and even converting the old elite 
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to the new vision; but it seems likely that the defenders of the 
status quo will condemn and suppress those who work visibly and 
effectively toward a new world system based on an ecological vi-
sion of wholeness. Prospects for change may not be at all serious 
until a countermovement emerges, perhaps one that identifies en-
vironmentalists as what they are, or should be: subverters of the 
existing order, apostles of a new order, aiming to do away with the 
war system, repudiators of the ideology of national sovereignty 
and of the mindless exploitation of the natural resources of the 
earth. 
The shape of this new order cannot now be blueprinted. It must 
be an expression of a collaborative process among the peoples of 
the world. It is certainly not a matter merely of extrapolating 
existing tendencies and designing a world state that draws in-
spiration from the nation-state form. At most we can make the 
case for the inadequacy of the present system of world order, 
combine it with a demonstration that the technological means 
exist to support a new equilibrium, and advance an argument for 
the realization of certain dominant values. The exact structures 
of order, processes of transition, and shifts in wealth-producing 
capabilities will depend on the way in which world-order reedu-
cation and interregional bargaining proceed in various parts of 
the world. How the new world order evolves will depend as well 
on how ecological deteriora tion manifests itself in the years ahead. 
The search for new solutions will surely grow more intense as the 
evidence mounts that we are faced with a crisis of survival. 
FOOTNOTES 
.:. Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, 
Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 
A different form of this essay will appear as a paper in the 1970 Pro-
ceedings of the American Society of International Law. The essay also 
reflects an approach that is more fully developed-with supporting evi-
dence and concrete proposals-in my book, This Endangered Planet, to 
be published early in 1971 by Random House. I wish to thank Claudia 
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